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Blest with victory and peace, may the
heav'n rescued land
Praise the Pow'r that hath made and
preserved us as a nation!
Then conquer we must, when our cause
it is just;
And this be our motto:
'In God is our trust.'
Stirring words. Some few may recognize them as from the last
stanza of The Star-Spangled Banner, by Act of Congress the Na-
tional Anthem since 1931. Devotional use, however, has been pro-
hibited by the New York State Commissioner of Education since
Engel v. Vitale." Reductio ad absurdum, but, nevertheless, an actual
application of the position of the Supreme Court on public prayer.
This and other results from the school prayer decisions are but a
portion of the analysis given by the author. His attitude is unequivo-
cal: "The school prayer decisions, handed down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1962 and 1963, were wrongly decided"
(p. ix). Therefore, his analysis is argument. Considering the burden,
it is borne well.
The author's criticism is directed to the series of cases more com-
monly known by their subject matter: the Regents' Prayer decision,2
and the subsequent single decision of two cases involving Bible
reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer.' In preface, the right to
critical comment is supported by a strong expression from the late
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone: "When the courts deal, as ours do,
with great public questions, the only protection against unwise deci-
sion, and even judicial usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their action
and fearless comment upon it" (p. 4). Further points, as the exci-
sion of the decisions is developed, are supported equally as ade-
quately by citation of authority.
Use of applicable authority to support propositions has a degree
of novelty not to be overlooked in the present dispute. The opinion
of the Supreme Court in the Regents' Prayer decision cites no case
law while, according to the author, placing reliance upon abstract
1 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 Engel v. Vitale, supra note 1.




logic and marginally relevant historical materials. Although it may
be agreed that the rule of stare decisis is not immutable, still inherit-
ance dictates a dignity to be accorded. And if, upon a rare occasion,
there may be no cases, there is little dignity in rhetoric alone or to
dictum from last year's decision.
It is upon these circumstances that the author builds a compre-
hensive argument against the validity of the school prayer cases. By
careful analysis the decisional antecedents are considered in terms
of factual setting and litigation purpose and results. From this, there
is developed a clarity in the criticism that the Court's rationale is
but rhetoric and its case authority not more than obiter dictum. For
those who look upon the decisions as representing the resolution of
the issue of total separation of church and state, the author's analysis
should prove enlightening. A most striking illustration of what must
be recognized as lack of continuity of result is found in subsequent
reliance by the Court upon a sweeping description of the meaning
of the First Amendment "establishment of religion" clause found
in Everson v. Board of Education.4 Yet this former case held consti-
tutional the reimbursement by a township of money spent by parents
for transportation of parochial pupils. As observed by the author,
"the holding of the case, however, has been overshadowed by its
rhetoric" (p. 9).
If continuity of result is lacking and purpose cannot be found, at
least the intent of the school prayer decisions seems manifest. Super-
ficially, it is to establish a neutrality among the "two-and-seventy
jarring sects."' With reason the author again states that the point is
wrongly decided. In matters of religion there can be no neutrality,
for not to believe is itself a belief. When the Government decrees
neutrality, we are warned of the likelihood that official silence will
be interpreted as official agnosticism. And despite the Supreme
Court's protestation that a "religion of secularism"6 is not to be
established under the First Amendment, such is the predictable
result.
Historically, a shibboleth of agnosticism and a state religion of
secularism seem far removed from the intent of the Constitutional
Convention. Yet, we have been admonished by Thomas Jefferson
and others to seek this intent in interpretation. Here the author finds
the occasion for his strongest indirect criticism of the Justices of the
Court which decided the school prayer cases. Even though first stat-
ing that "it is definitely not a purpose of this book to draw into
4 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5 Khayyam, Rubaiyat, Quatrain LIX.
6 School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, supra note 3, at 225.
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question in any way the good faith of the Justices of the Supreme
Court," there follows, without additional comment, a quotation
levelled at another Court: "'The question arises, how far a court is
entitled to indulge in bad history and bad logic without having its
good faith challenged.. .' " (p. x).
The agnostic neutrality now thrust by the Supreme Court upon
the populus, whereby the belief is that there is no "official belief,"
appears to the author without foundation in the records of the
framers of the Constitution. Insofar as the support of the public
prayer decisions leans upon MADISON'S MEMORIAL AND REMON-
STRANCE, it is rightly observed that the references used may not be
wholly material. Further, it may be noted that the Constitution is not
the work of Mr. Madison alone. Others did contribute. Indeed, in
the debates, as recorded in Madison's notes, a passing contribution
has greater significance than might first have been appreciated.
Responsive to Mr. Franklin's motion that the deliberations be pre-
ceded by prayer led by Clergy of the City, the prior lack of such
ceremony was explained as "Mr. WILLIAMSON, observed that the
true cause of the omission could not be mistaken. The Convention
had no funds" (p. 38). Amusing, were it not that some might argue
today that inaction upon the motion shows an active antipathy of
the Convention toward acknowledgement of God.
Later excerpts from Congressional action upon the "establishment
clause" of the First Amendment become almost anecdotal in light
of recent decision. It is reported that Benjamin Huntington of Con-
necticut hoped "the amendment would be made in such a way as to
secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of
religion, but not to patronize those who professed no religion at all"
(p. 43). Interest is expressed by the author in having Mr. Hunting-
ton's unvarnished opinion of the school prayer decisions.
Sufficient that the school prayer cases were wrongly decided, (re-
phrasing the author), "in the undesirable consequences of their con-
tinued ascendency, the absurdity of their posture of neutrality, and
the inaccuracy of their historical foundation" (p. 131). What solu-
tion is to be found? Judicial restraint is proposed as a possibility.
Alternatively, the solution is suggested by legislation or constitu-
tional amendment.
Touching upon the former, palpable argument is advanced with
reference to Frothingham v. Mellon7 that the standing of parties to
sue easily might be challenged in these and a plethora of prospec-
tive cases. In addition, to avoid an abrogation of religious heritage
7 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
[Vol. 2
BOOK REVIEWS
in preposterous dimensions, the Supreme Court might consider re-
viving the comatose Tenth Amendment to the Constitution. There is
even the extreme of retreat from what Mr. Justice Stewart has cate-
gorized as "resounding but fallacious fundamentalist logic."' Lack-
ing all these, the latter solution of legislation or constitutional
amendment remains.
Throughout the solutions suggested, however, there runs a thread
of hopelessness woven from a general lack of directed concern.
Although this author's efforts may be hoped to stimulate effective
consideration of the problems and excesses in the school prayer
decisions of the Supreme Court, still one is brought to wonder what
the final decision may be-especially if it is to be handed down,
instead of by nine jurists, by One.
J. Mark Rhoads*
8 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414, 416 (1963).
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